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Abstract 
Local borrowing is one of the fundamental pillars of fiscally decentralized 
systems—together with the assignment of functional expenditure responsibilities, 
revenue assignments, and transfers. However, undisciplined use of local debt can 
lead to disruptions in public service delivery at the subnational level and, more 
significantly, have important negative externality effects on the macroeconomic 
stability of the entire country. This paper surveys the actual practice with debt 
governance of Non-Asian Emerging Economies (NAEE) for the last several 
decades with the main objective of extracting lessons (both positive and negative) 
for the development of best practice around the world.  
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Local borrowing is one of the fundamental pillars of fiscally decentralized systems—
together with the assignment of functional expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments, and 
transfers. By issuing debt and getting other forms of loans, local governments can contribute to 
financing the local infrastructure much needed for all kinds of service delivery.1 This form of 
financing infrastructure is both efficient and addresses hard liquidity issues. In addition, borrowing 
is intergenerationally equitable because it distributes the costs across the different generations that 
are users of the services provided by the infrastructure facility.2 However, undisciplined use of 
local debt can lead to disruptions in public service delivery at the subnational level and, more 
significantly, have important negative externality effects on the macroeconomic stability of the 
entire country (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996). Broadly speaking, subnational authorities are 
widely perceived as having less concern than central governments for macroeconomic stability 
because often they do not have to bear the costs of their debt policies (Ter-Minassian, 1997a).  
There are two fundamental reasons why subnational governments may be undisciplined 
regarding borrowing behavior. First, the design of the fiscal decentralization system may be—
typically is—faulty. While most fiscal decentralization reforms have devolved significant 
expenditure authority, they have done so much less in terms of revenue authority. This form of 
                                                          
1 Besides borrowing, subnational governments typically finance their capital expenditure needs with current account 
savings or surpluses, capital grants from the central government, and the sale of assets (e.g., land). 
2 In the paper, we use the term ‘borrowing’ in a generic sense, which includes at least four different sources: from 
the central governments, which may involve political criteria and moral hazard; from municipal development funds 
(MDFs), which often fail to impose market discipline (Ferguson, 1993); from commercial banks, which can lack 
transparency and carry poor terms and conditions (Nguyen et al., 2017); and from capital markets issuing bonds. In 
turn, there are different types of bonds. Revenue bonds, at times also called project finance, are paid back with the 
earmarked revenues generated from the project where the funds are invested. Most bonds are “full faith and credit” 
or correspond to balance sheet finance and are secured by all tax and non-tax revenues and liquid assets of the 
subnational governments. Of course, this does not mean that the subnational government will always be able to 




asymmetric decentralization leads to large vertical imbalances, which are routinely closed with 
high degrees of local government dependence from central transfers. This in turn, through the 
common pool problem, leads to excessive local spending and lower tax effort because transfers 
represent little cost of obtaining marginal funds and leads to moral hazard and expectations of 
bailouts for excessive borrowing. 
Second, even when no such defects are present in fiscal decentralization design, there are 
simple political economy reasons why local officials—actually officials at all levels—may be 
undisciplined regarding borrowing and debt. In simple terms, borrowing allows huge increases in 
local spending, the cutting of ribbons for infrastructure projects, etc., while it postpones most of 
the payments to future times. Local officials seeking local votes may see additional borrowing and 
spending as an expedited way to get that support, while the (political) costs are shifted as 
responsibilities of other officials to come.  
Thus, ensuring disciplined and responsible local borrowing behavior requires more than 
good decentralization design. It also requires explicit rules, monitoring and oversight regarding 
local government debt. This implies that prohibiting borrowing is not a good solution because it is 
inefficient. The question is how to provide a legal framework and practice that allows local 
governments flexibility to pursue optimal service delivery while preventing undisciplined or 
irresponsible behavior in good times or in times of economic crisis. 
This paper surveys the actual practice with debt governance of Non-Asian Emerging 
Economies (NAEE)3 for the last several decades with the main objective of extracting lessons 
(both positive and negative) for the development of best practice around the world. The 2008 
                                                          




global financial crisis and the Great Recession that ensued produced sharp declines in economic 
activity in many fiscally decentralized developed and developing countries. As discussed below, 
the sharp macroeconomic downturn put fiscal decentralization and debt governance institutions to 
test in the NAEE group of countries. For example, it has been argued that the lack of flexibility in 
subnational borrowing limited the contribution of some subnational governments to support 
national fiscal stimulus policies (Fardoust and Ravishankar, 2013). Actually, a significant part of 
the evolution of subnational borrowing regulations and overall governance in NAEE has been the 
result of reactions to other types of crises, debt crises. For example, emerging economies such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have experienced subnational government debt crises in 
the last two decades from which new regulatory frameworks for subnational fiscal and debt 
management have emerged.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the relevant 
literature in fiscal federalism, focusing on the debate of whether inherent features of fiscal 
decentralization contribute to macroeconomic instability and the empirical evidence on the impact 
of local debt governance on the outcomes. The third section remarks on the importance of 
comprehensiveness in the definition and quantification of the many different dimensions or types 
of debt for rules and monitoring to be effective. The fourth section examines the overall trends in 
subnational debt over the last decades in non-Asian emerging economies. The fifth section reviews 
the actual practice with borrowing rules in those countries, while the sixth examines the particular 
case of fiscal responsibility laws in Latin American countries, which generally go beyond 
borrowing regulations. The following section examines the monitoring and enforcement of fiscal 




Review of the Literature and Theoretical Framework 
Since Oates’ (1972) seminal contribution, it has been long accepted that decentralization 
can deliver a more efficient allocation of public resources. Other potential benefits associated with 
decentralization have been identified, but one area that traditionally has been considered as 
problematic is the impact of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability (Martinez-
Vazquez et al., 2017). Over the last four or more decades, there has been intensive study of what 
may be the potential causes of fiscal indiscipline at the subnational level and the role of fiscal 
institution and fiscal rules. While many papers study the role of tax autonomy and 
intergovernmental transfers on subnational budgetary discipline, empirical works that examine the 
effectiveness of subnational borrowing regulations are relatively very few. 
Multiple papers have researched the potential negative impact of poor decentralization 
design on fiscal discipline. Rodden et al. (2003) and Oates (2008), among others, highlight that 
lack of tax autonomy and large vertical fiscal imbalances (VFIs) as one of the leading factors for 
the subnational fiscal indiscipline. The presence of large VFIs and transfer dependence lead to 
common pool problems (Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). These arise because subnational 
governments fail to internalize the true cost of public expenditures—that is, their perceived 
marginal cost of funds is lower because other jurisdictions in the country are contributing to the 
central transfers received (Rodden, 2002). Also, large VFIs can lead to moral hazard and bailout 
expectations, especially when combined with unlimited borrowing (Rodden, 2002; Bordignon, 
2006; Crivelli and Stall, 2013; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013, Asartyan et al., 2015). 
There is also a considerable empirical literature that has simply looked into the question of 
whether in reality decentralization is associated with higher macroeconomic instability (Martinez-




Interestingly, and somewhat at odds with a priori expectations, these studies actually find no effect 
or positive effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic stability.  
A number of additional papers have also explored the role played by borrowing and other 
fiscal rules, which many governments have introduced over the past several decades to keep in 
check subnational governments’ proclivity to abuse their borrowing powers (Jin and Zou, 2002; 
Rodden, 2002; Plekhanov and Singh, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic, 2017). However, 
most of this literature focuses on the theoretical dimensions of rules, or they are country-specific 
case studies at the subnational level.4 Overall, these studies still fall short of providing robust 
results about the effectiveness of the different institutional arrangements that may lead subnational 
governments to the most desirable fiscal outcomes.  
Along with the more recent adoption of Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) in emerging 
and developed economies, some empirical papers have examined the impact of these FRLs on 
fiscal outcomes. So far, the evidence appears to be mixed. Caceres et al. (2010) empirically test 
whether fiscal performance improves with the implementation of FRLs using a sample of Latin 
America and advanced countries. They find that FRLs provide a positive but limited effect on 
fiscal outcomes. Similarly, Mello (2005) finds that FRLs in Brazil have a significant positive effect 
on the primary balances. However, Thornton (2009), who analyzes the impact of FRLs on fiscal 
discipline in nine emerging market economies, finds no significant effect on fiscal performance. 
The most recent innovation in fiscal governance over the last decade has been the 
introduction of fiscal councils. In some cases—like in the cases of Hungary and Nigeria—fiscal 
councils were established as a part of FRLs. In all cases, developed and developing countries, 
                                                          
4 Braun and Tommasi (2004) analyzes the subnational fiscal rules from a game theoretic approach. Ter-Minassian 




fiscal councils have been adopted as a more or less independent authority to monitor and help 
enforce fiscal rules. The original idea had been whether a truly independent authority—similar to 
the role played by central banks regarding monetary policy—should control government debt and 
deficits (von Hagen and Harden, 1995; Calmfors, 2003; Wyplosz, 2005), the main argument being 
that most governments are time-inconsistent regarding their short-run fiscal policy objectives and 
long-term fiscal stability performance (Wyplosz, 2005).  
How effective are fiscal councils? This institutional innovation is fairly new and just a few 
developing countries have adopted fiscal councils. But, even though the population size is small 
and the time is limited, the preponderance of the findings is that they can play a significant role in 
improving fiscal discipline and overall performance. This is especially the case when they are 
provided with more independence and authority (Hagemann, 2011; Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 
2011; Debrun and Kumar, 2012 and Debrun and Kinda, 2017). Even though most existing councils 
make some forms of ex-ante and ex-post policy assessments and fiscal sustainability analysis, 
practically none of them go beyond the evaluation of current policies and forecasts; in particular, 
they lack any legal authority to determine national debt or deficit levels, which are still reserved—
unlike the case of independent central banks—to elected authorities. Also important from our 
perspective, existing fiscal councils mainly focus on central governments, and therefore, there is 
little evidence so far about the impact of fiscal councils on subnational borrowing and fiscal 
discipline. However, clearly the combination of public reports and high media impact of fiscal 




One last relevant fiscal institution, which has been around for a long time but has attained 
special attention in the aftermath of the Great Recession, is the practice of “rainy day funds.”5 
Practically all states in the U.S. have adopted rainy day funds to protect their budgets and spending 
against unexpected economic shocks and uncertainties and to minimize the disruptions caused by 
economic fluctuations and sharp declines in revenues. Their effectiveness in the past has depended 
on the size of the shock and the types of expenditures protected (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996; 
Knight and Levinson, 1999; Zhao, 2016; Gonzales and Paqueo, 2003). There is no consensus on 
the optimal balance of rainy day funds, but the recommendations following the 2008 crisis 
increased to 15 percent of annual revenues, against the suggested rates of 3 percent to 5 percent in 
the 1980s (Haggerty and Griffin, 2014). 
The Elusive Definition and Quantification of Subnational Debt 
An important difficulty with the good governance of debt at the subnational level is to be 
able to identify well all the different forms debt can take and then be able to properly quantify all 
those dimensions. This is important because subnational governments can bypass controls and 
even prohibitions by adapting less visible or formal forms of debt. This is a practice common to 
many countries, developed and developing. It took an extreme form in recent years in China where 
the law formally prohibited subnational governments from borrowing, but in recent years, many 
subnational governments there have found themselves heavily indebted and near bankruptcy. This 
is because they had used indirect borrowing vehicles and, of course, never officially borrowed any 
funds. Similarly, even though local governments in Chile are not allowed to borrow, they do so de 
                                                          
5 Other related funds such as commodity stabilization funds and sovereign funds are not included. These are 
generally national fiscal instruments rather than subnational instruments. However, subnational stabilization funds 
have been discussed in countries like Peru where subnational governments depend significantly on revenues from 




facto through arrears to suppliers and in contributions to government funds, as well as leasing 
contracts (Letelier, 2011). Thus, it is important to be clear what constitutes debt and that we are 
able to measure it. 
The IMF (2001) defines debt as any liability that consists of the payment of interest and 
principle by a debtor to a creditor at a date(s) in the future. Therefore, subnational government 
debt should be inclusive of all forms of all liabilities either explicitly contracted (e.g., bank loans, 
bond issues, or central government loans) or otherwise created by sub-central governments (e.g., 
accruals or arrears in payments to suppliers or providers). Even though there may be generalized 
agreement with the definition and scope of what subnational debt is, there is not a generalized 
accepted practice for how to measure and report all the dimensions. As a result, there is no 
agreement either on what may be sustainable or unsustainable subnational debt levels. For 
example, there is typically agreement—although not always done in practice—that accrued unpaid 
bill or arrears should be included in the computation of overall debt.6 However, should unfunded 
contingent liabilities of subnational government pension funds or other unfunded future liabilities 
be part of the overall computation of debt levels of subnational governments?7  
What this amounts to is that subnational governments may be able to manipulate their 
actual debt levels to satisfy particular types of debt ceilings and sustainability measures. This 
manipulation must be added to the fact that central and local governments may use different rules 
to define debt and deficit within the same country and that those may differ considerably across 
countries (Irwin, 2005). Furthermore, the analysis of subnational debt sustainability can be 
                                                          
6 Having a good idea of what those arrears are requires, among other things, accrual accounting, but many 
subnational governments continue to use cash accounting, so the arrears can be undetected and unaccounted for. 
7 For example, according to a Pew Charitable Trusts, the gap between the total assets reported by state government 






complicated because of the lack of tax autonomy as well as the various legal restrictions on sub-
central governments imposed by a higher level of government. 
General Subnational Government Debt Trends in Non-Asian Emerging Economies 
With the caveat that we may not always be accounting for the totality of debt that should 
be accounted for, we move next to analyze the recent trends in the overall level of subnational 
government debt in non-Asian emerging economies.8 We group these emerging countries in three 
groups with distinctive characteristics: emerging countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico); emerging countries in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia); and then separately two countries in Africa (Nigeria 
and South Africa), the Russian Federation, and Turkey.9 
Subnational government debt levels in the Latin America group are relatively high in terms 
of GDP and in terms of total consolidated debt but show clearly declining trends. Subnational debt 
was as high as 20 percent of GDP in Brazil in the early 2000s, but it has been declining toward 10 
percent, while in Argentina and Colombia this is closer to 5 percent of GDP (Figure 1a). Mexico 
has the lowest percentages in the group. By comparison, the average value of subnational debt in 
OECD countries in 2014 was 23.9 percent.10 In terms of consolidated debt, there is convergence 
toward 15 percent of the total for Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. In the case of Mexico, again 
the numbers are lower, approximating 5 percent of total debt (Figure 1b). By comparison, 
subnational debt in OECD countries represented 19.8 percent of total public debt on average in 
                                                          
8 Data on subnational government debt were collected from various sources including IMF country reports, 
related country's Ministry of Finance reports, National Statistical Agencies, and Central Bank sources. For the total 
consolidated government debt, we used the IMF’s Historical Public Debt Database. 
9 Data were not available for other non-Asian emerging economies: Egypt, Iran, Mauritius, Oman, Qatar, and United 
Arab Emirates. Therefore, these countries were excluded from the analysis.  






Figure 1a. Latin America Subnational Government (SNG) Debt Trends  
as a Percentage of GDP  
 
Figure 1b. Latin America SNG Debt Trends  
as a Percentage of Total Country Consolidated Debt 
 
In contrast to Latin America, subnational debt levels in Eastern Europe are relatively low 
both as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total debt, but generally they show increasing 
















































countries was generally below 5 percent (Figure 2a). In terms of total debt, there has been 
convergence in all Eastern European countries for subnational debt to represent between 5 and 10 
percent of the total (Figure 2b).  
Figure 2a. Eastern Europe SNG Debt Trend as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Figure 2b. Eastern Europe SNG Debt Trend  


















































In the case of South Africa, subnational debt as a percentage of GDP and a percentage of 
total consolidated debt has increased sharply since the start of the financial crisis in 2007. This is 
shown in Figures 3a and 3b together with averages for Latin America and Eastern Europe. In the 
case of Nigeria, there is also a sharp increase from 2011, but this is mostly due to the unavailability 
of data for domestic subnational debt before that year.  
Figure 3a. Regional Comparison for SNG Debts as percent of GDP 
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Figure 3b. Regional Comparison for SNG Debts  
as a Percentage of Total Consolidated Debt 
 
Borrowing Rules in Emerging Non-Asian Economies 
Over the past several decades, non-Asian emerging economies, following worldwide 
trends, have increasingly made use of explicit borrowing rules in an effort to ensure that the 
borrowing authority of subnational governments did not lead to fiscal indiscipline and 
macroeconomic instability in the country. Just about every country has had its own internal 
evolution propelled by different experiences, as we document more closely in the next section for 
the case of emerging economies in Latin America. As we have seen, even when fiscal 
decentralization systems are well designed with a symmetrical provision of spending and taxing 
powers, there are strong political economy incentives for subnational authorities to act myopically 
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an inefficient solution to the problem,11 borrowing rules are clearly necessary.12 Nevertheless, the 
questions are: What type of borrowing rules? Are there better rules?  
Borrowing rules regimes  
In this section, we examine the evolutions of the different types of borrowing rules adopted 
by non-Asian emerging economies. In the analysis, we follow Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) 
who first classified subnational borrowing regulations and debt supervision into four categories:13 
i) Administrative regulation, ii) Cooperative regulation, iii) Rule-based regulation, iv) Market-
based regulation. In what follows, we briefly describe the approaches and indicate which of the 
non-Asian emerging countries has adopted it.14 
A. Administrative Approach 
The administrative regulation approach gives power to the central government to directly 
control the subnational government debt through different instruments, including debt ceilings, 
prohibition of external borrowing, and prior approval of conditions for any new debt. The direct 
control of the central government on subnational government borrowing is more frequently seen 
in unitary countries—and in those at early stages of decentralization—than in federal states (Ter-
Minassian, 1997). The administrative regulation approach has the advantage of being better able 
to ensure macroeconomic stability since central authorities can directly control borrowing at all 
                                                          
11 Outright prohibition has not been that uncommon in the past. At least one of the countries included in the analysis 
sample, Chile, still prohibits its subnational governments from borrowing. In the early 1990s in the transition years 
to a market economy, several Eastern European countries prohibited subnational borrowing.  
12 Conceptually, if the costs of borrowing and those of intergovernmental transfers were the same across all levels of 
government, the structure of borrowing among various government levels would not be a concern (Wildasin, 2004). 
But, in reality those costs are not the same because of moral hazard and common pool problems. Hence, the need to 
regulate subnational government borrowing. 
13 This classification has been widely used in the subnational borrowing literature. See, for example, Plekhanov and 
Singh (2007) and Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic (2017). 




levels. This approach may also facilitate better financial terms and conditions for subnational 
governments since foreign lenders often use the central government as an on-lender to subnational 
governments and at the same time obtain repayment guarantees from the central government. 
However, the administrative approach would seem to be contradictory to the idea of fiscal 
decentralization. Because of the close tutoring and direct engagement of the central government 
in the operation of subnational borrowing, there may be a perception among lenders of potential 
bailouts and there may be less self-discipline by subnational governments. 
Among the non-Asian emerging economies, we identify Mexico as the only country clearly using 
the administrative approach. In Mexico, there is a recent history of financial bailouts of subnational 
governments. Currently, state and local governments can borrow up to the debt ceilings set by a 
higher-level authority. Moreover, they can only borrow from domestic sources and those funds 
can only finance public investment expenditures. Interestingly, in addition to administrative 
controls, Mexico also uses financial sector regulations—essentially a system of credit ratings, 
which are discussed below—that add a layer of prudence to all subnational borrowing activities.  
B. Cooperative Approach 
In this approach, the law, the constitution, or a higher-level of government do not determine 
subnational debt regulations. Instead, these regulations are established through negotiations 
between the central and subnational governments. In this category, regional and local governments 
are actively in a dialogue with the central government regarding subnational revenues and 
expenditures, the national deficit target, as well as debt ceilings, including those for the regional 
and local governments. One clear advantage of this approach is that it promotes the dialogue 
between the central and the subnational government levels, thus raising general awareness about 




downside is that afterwards it requires voluntary action. When the cooperation is poorly 
implemented or breaks down, it may lead to an increase in the bargaining power of subnational 
governments and lead to abandoning the budgetary discipline at the regional and local government 
levels (Plekhanov and Singh, 2007).  
Among the emerging economies in our sample, South Africa uses a combination of 
cooperative and market-based approaches to regulate subnational borrowing (Liebig et al., 2008). 
The Constitution (article 3) mandates cooperation among the various government levels in order 
to determine how much they can borrow. In practice, there is no fixed debt ceiling on the regional 
and local governments, and these subnational entities are able to borrow with considerable 
flexibility, subject to financial market constraints.  
C. Rule-based Approach 
Rather than resting on central discretion or voluntary agreements, this approach relies on 
compliance with clearly stated ex-ante rules that subnational governments need to follow when 
they borrow. To restrict subnational borrowing, fiscal rules are specified in a legal framework 
listing in different combinations: debt ceilings or limits on total borrowing, ceilings on debt service 
expenditure (for principal and interest), the “golden rule” (funds can only be used to finance 
investment on infrastructure), rules on who can be a lender, and so on. A clear goal is to relate the 
level of borrowing to the repayment capacity of the borrower entity. A second goal is to make 
subnational fiscal outcomes predictable. Because most often the rules are specified in the national 
legal framework, they are known as centrally-imposed rules. However, it is possible for 
subnational governments to also have self-imposed rules.  
While it may seem relatively straight forward to monitor legal limits of total debt or limits 




may use off-budget procedures, which allows them to accumulate debt beyond the prescribed rules. 
See Box 1. Similarly, using the “golden rule” is not a guarantee of fiscal sustainability and 
macroeconomic stability since infrastructure investments may not actually provide in the end 
socially and economically profitable returns. 
The rule-based approach has the clear advantages of transparency and flexibility within 
certain limits and not having to rely on unnecessary bureaucracy or long negotiations between the 
central and subnational authorities, which may also include political rather than economic 
components. Nevertheless, the rule-based approach has the clear disadvantage of inflexibility. By 
its nature, this approach may reduce the effectiveness of subnational fiscal policies during a 
financial crisis when it may be necessary to increase public expenditure. However, breaking the 
rules once may create a bad precedent for the future and weaken the overall effectiveness of the 
rules. In practice, the rule-based approach is the most commonly used among non-Asian emerging 
economies, having been adopted in Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and the Russian Federation. 
D. Market-based Approach 
Under this approach, the central government does not regulate subnational government 
debt limits but rather relies on financial markets to regulate and restrict subnational borrowing. 
Here, therefore, it is up to the subnational governments to decide on the source of the debt, its 
terms and conditions, and the amount that they want to borrow. And it is up to the financial markets 
to regulate and restrict access to borrowing by subnational governments. For financial markets to 
be able to do this job properly, they must have access to accurate information and indicators on 
the subnational governments’ ability to repay the debt. Lane (1993) has characterized the set of 




subnational borrowing: a) financial markets should operate freely and be open. There should not 
exist such regulations that force financial entities to give loans to subnational governments, 
constituting a privilege; b) it should be well-stated that no bailouts by the central government are 
possible; c) financial markets should be able to access available information to evaluate 
subnational governments’ credibility based on its outstanding debt and repayment capacity; and d) 
subnational governments should have the ability to react with an adequate response to the market 
performance. 
Most emerging economies do not have subnational financial markets that comply with the 
above conditions. In fact, those financial market conditions are only present in just a handful of 
developed economies. Nevertheless, even in these economies, credit-rating agencies play a key 
role in evaluating the repayment capabilities of subnational governments. Thus, since in most non-
Asian emerging economies, financial markets at the subnational level are not sufficiently well-
developed to access adequate information on subnational governments’ fiscal performance, the 
market-based approach is not well suited to effectively regulate subnational borrowing in these 
countries. Currently, none of the non-Asian emerging economies in our sample use this approach. 
However, several Eastern European countries have attempted to use it in the past. In addition, some 
countries, like Mexico, have introduced a subnational credit rating system, which works as a 
complementary tool for whatever other approach they are using—the administrative approach in 
the case of Mexico. Table 1 summarizes the borrowing rules regime adopted by each of the non-
Asian emerging economies in our sample at three moments in time: 1990, 2000, and 2010. It 
should be remembered that even though we classify each country in a particular category, many 
of these countries do not always fit neatly in that category because they use features of different 




One clear message from the information in Table 1 is that, in the span of a decade, many of the 
non-Asian emerging economies have changed subnational borrowing regimes. For example, while 
in 1990 at least three countries entirely prohibited subnational borrowing, in 2010 only Chile 
maintained that prohibition.  
Table 1. Borrowing Rules Used across Years in Non-Asian Emerging Countries 
 1990 2000 2010 
Prohibited 
Bulgari Chile Chile 
Chile   
Poland   
Romania   
Administrative 
Brazil Mexico Mexico 
Mexico Nigeria Nigeria 
Russia Russia Slovenia 
Slovenia Slovenia Turkey 
Turkey Turkey  
Centrally-
imposed rule 
Colombia Brazil Brazil 
 Colombia Bulgaria 




  Hungary 
  Poland 
  Romania 
  Russia 
Self-imposed 
rule 
Argentina Argentina (None) 
Cooperative 
South Africa Romania Argentina 










The trends in the adoption of borrowing regimes are more clearly shown in Figure 4. While 
just one of the countries in our sample had adopted the regime of centrally imposed rules in 1990, 




emerging economies. The attraction of central rules is that it offers both transparency and an 
indirect, high degree of central government control. The only other regime that experienced an 
increase in the number of users is the cooperative regime—but only very modestly from one user 
in 1990 to two in 2010. All other regimes, including outright prohibition, have decreased in 
popularity, and none of them was used by more than two countries in the sample in 2010.  
Figure 4. Subnational Borrowing Rules for Non-Asian Emerging Countries 
 
As we have pointed out in several places in the discussion above, regardless of the specific 
borrowing regime adopted, many countries have also opted to apply what we could call cross-
cutting general rules that help better define the regulatory framework for subnational governments 
and also give central administrations more control over subnational borrowing. The most popular 
of those cross-cutting rules and the number of non-Asian emerging countries that have adopted 
them are depicted in Figure 5. There we can see that most countries in the sample had adopted 
overall limits on subnational debt by 2010. In addition, the vast majority has adopted the “golden 











































borrowing to allowing it with prior approval and, less so, just to allow it.  
Figure 5. Cross-Cutting Rules for Debt Regulations  
among Non-Asian Emerging Economies 
 
Are there better performing rules? 
What do we know about which approach to borrowing regulations works best? As we have 
seen, it is not hard to identify features in most of these approaches that would seem to give them 
some kind of an advantage. For example, one may suggest that the rule-based approach is superior 
to the administrative approach from the viewpoint of budget transparency and certainty or that the 
cooperative approach has the advantage of directly involving subnational governments in the 
pursuit of fiscal stability (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997). However, each approach encompasses 
multiple dimensions, and clearly none of the approaches a priori dominates all those dimensions.  
Alternatively, we may try to answer the question of what borrowing regulation works best 
by conducting statistical regression analysis, which is well suited to help disentangle multivariate 
















such as Plekhanov and Sing (2007) and Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic (2017). The general 
conclusion reached in those statistical studies is that no particular borrowing regulation appears to 
dominate the rest and that the more general rules, such as the “golden rule” and limits on debt and 
borrowing, appear to be effective. Regarding the choice of subnational government borrowing 
regulations, the depth of the financial market is notably essential for cooperative and rule-based 
regulations. On the other hand, the cooperative approach has a positive impact on general 
government fiscal discipline, even in the act of a high vertical fiscal imbalance and high levels of 
subnational debt (Martinez-Vazquez and Vulovic, 2017). Moreover, rule-based approaches at 
subnational governments seem to have a positive effect on fiscal performance in the case of low 
levels of intergovernmental transfers. However, in the case of high vertical fiscal imbalances, 
centrally-imposed rules seem to lead to better fiscal outcomes than self-imposed rule-based 
approaches among emerging economies (Plekhanov and Singh, 2007). 
In summary, the empirical evidence on subnational borrowing regulations suggests that 
none of the borrowing regulations is clearly superior to the other types of approaches. This finding 
may suggest that implementation and enforcement and conditionality on the country’s overall 
fiscal structure and its decentralization level may be key to the effectiveness of each different 
borrowing regulation. Needless to say, the empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of the 
different borrowing rules at the subnational level only capture the presence of a particular 
borrowing rule. Data on the effectiveness of implementation and actual level of monitoring of the 
particular rule are not readily available. That represents a very significant caveat. Therefore, it 
would be proper to say that the conclusions reached in that empirical literature should be 
interpreted as works in progress. A difficulty still to be sorted out is how to get around the potential 




the four categories of borrowing regimes based on a judgement call, and then a dummy variable is 
used in the estimation to indicate each rule. However, this may be misleading. For example, many 
countries use a combination of the different borrowing rules. For example, South Africa chooses 
a combination of the cooperative regulation and market-based discipline. Also, those regulations 
tend to change over time. Therefore, even though, the categorization of the four types of borrowing 
regulations clearly provides useful information for policymakers, more detailed study is still 
needed for precisely understanding the effectiveness of the different approaches.  
An index for borrowing authority  
A different approach to measuring the borrowing authority actually devolved to 
subnational governments is to estimate a borrowing autonomy index for each of countries in which 
we are interested. Such an index has been proposed by Hooghe et al. (2016). The index captures a 
variety of relevant fiscal regulations into a scalar taking values between 0 and 3. Specifically, the 
borrowing autonomy index takes into account whether an approval for a debt by higher-level 
government is required, whether debt limits are in force, whether the “golden rule” is in place, and 
whether foreign borrowing is allowed. The index is explained in more detail in Appendix 1, where 
we also show the country-specific graphs depicting the borrowing autonomy index. As seen in the 
country-specific graphs, subnational borrowing autonomy has been strictly restricted via FRLs in 
Latin America countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia after the subnational debt crises 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. One obvious conclusion one reaches observing the different 
country drafts is the variation over time in the index and how many countries have oscillated 
between providing subnational governments with significant borrowing authority followed by 
significant restrictions and back again. Figure 6 summarizes the distribution of subnational 




and 2010. The general trend observed is toward a reduction in subnational borrowing authority, 
which parallels the trend observed above for borrowing regulations, with more central government 
control on the rise. 
Figure 6. Subnational Borrowing Autonomy in Non-Asian Emerging Countries 
 
Fiscal Responsibility Laws as a Response to Systemic Subnational Debt Crises in 
Latin America  
Going beyond borrowing rules, some non-Asian emerging countries have introduced 
during the last decades more comprehensive legal frameworks in order to further buttress their 
macroeconomic fiscal stability. As we have already seen, these are known as Fiscal Responsibility 
Laws (FRLs). FRLs are designed to address wider fiscal governance issues, including short-time 
planning horizons, moral hazard, and common pool problems. Typically, they are framed within 
medium-term fiscal horizons, emphasizing budget transparency and accountability, the monitoring 
of fiscal targets, the inclusion of enforcement measures, and often carefully-specified escape 
clauses (Liu and Webb, 2016). In this respect, the experience of several Latin American emerging 











































about and how they have worked so far in those countries. The FRLs have attempted to address 
fiscal coordination failures between the central and subnational governments, which resulted in 
significant macroeconomic crises starting in the 1980s. The FRLs can be seen as national fiscal 
frameworks covering monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, budget transparency, and 
numerical fiscal targets for the different levels of government (Liu and Webb, 2016). Overall, the 
introduction of FRLs appears to have brought better coordination of fiscal policies at the different 
levels of government and to have contributed to enhanced fiscal sustainability, especially where 
they have been supported by other fiscal rules. In this section, we revise the experience with FRLs 
of four emerging countries in Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru). At the end 
of the section, we provide stylized information on the FRLs of the four countries in Box 3.  
The case of Brazil 
Brazil experienced large subnational debt crises during the 1980s and early 1990s. During 
those crises, the central government provided bailouts to some subnational units, which led to 
moral hazard and further abuses. During the post-crisis period and as result of debt-restructuring 
negotiations with the states,15 several pieces of legislation were approved at the national level, 
including the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2000. The Fiscal Responsibility Law introduces debt-
level limits, controls new debt flows, and creates a rule-based system for subnational borrowing. 
The rule-based system operates on the principle of market discipline emphasizing that no central 
government bailouts will be available and that all new regional or local government debt issues 
and loans are subject to the approval of the federal Ministry of Finance. However, the FRL 
framework goes beyond borrowing rules and controls. Box 2 describes these in further details.  
                                                          
15 Debt restructuring between the federal Treasury and subnational governments required a 20-percent down 





Box 2: The Fiscal Responsibility Framework of Brazil16 
The fiscal responsibility legislations in Brazil consist of: legislations enacted in 1995 
and 1999 that limit personnel spending; Senate Resolutions issued in 1998 that set up the 
maximum debt level; prudential regulations and supervision of financial institutions’ exposure 
to subnational debt; and the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) enacted in May 2000. 
While on the revenue side the FRL restricts the federal transfers to the states which do not 
perform satisfactorily in collecting their taxes, on the expenditure side, the FRL prohibits any 
permanent increase in spending without having a permanent revenue source corresponding to 
that particular expenditure.  
The FRL also mandates ceilings on personnel expenditure for state and municipal 
governments not to exceed 60 percent of current net revenues.17  
The FRL and complementary legislation enacted in 2001 mandate the “golden rule” for 
capital expenditure and debt limits. In particular, the maximum debt level cannot exceed 200 
percent of net current revenues for state governments and 120 percent for municipal 
governments.  
However, the FRL also contains an escape clause for the debt limits. Specifically, the 
ceilings on the total debt and personnel spending can be extended in the case of at least 1 percent 
of contraction in the economy during the four subsequent quarters. By congressional approval, 
these escape clauses can also take place in times of natural disasters.  
The FRL also introduces reporting measures. State and municipal governments are 
                                                          
16 This is based on de Mello (2015) and the actual legal framework of Brazil.  
17 These regulations for different ceilings for state and municipal government levels are based on the legislation 
enacted in 1995 (Camata Law I). Posterior legislation, in 1997 and in 1999, introduced additional details on the 




required to present bi-monthly executive reports and four-month reports showing compliance 
with the FRL framework. Moreover, state governments must report their fiscal outturn for the 
previous year to the Ministry of Finance by end-May, and municipal governments by end-April. 
The legislative councils at the state and municipal levels are required to monitor compliance 
with the FRL and other fiscal rules, assisted by their respective Court of Accounts.  
Banks’ exposure to the government debt (including central, state, municipal 
governments, as well as public companies and all decentralized jurisdictions) is restricted up to 
45 percent of their net wealth. 
 
The case of Argentina  
Like in the case of Brazil, Argentina experienced debt crises in the 1990s due to excessive 
debts incurred by provincial governments that had to be bailed out, leading to the monetization of 
the debt and hyperinflation at the national level.18 Until the end of the 1990s, Argentina had 
adopted a market-based borrowing approach for its subnational governments. But, market 
discipline actually did not work, and there was considerable over-borrowing and fiscal failure. The 
first legislation that can be considered part of the FRL framework was a fiscal solvency law, passed 
by the National Congress in 1999 to regulate debt payments. However, this solvency law lacked 
enforcement mechanisms and was followed by non-compliance in more than one half of the 
provinces.19 The main reason was that the 1999 Solvency Law mainly applied to the national 
government, while it simply requested provincial governments to pass their own laws. Many 
                                                          
18 A big part of the initial problems in Brazil and Argentina was that regional governments were allowed to borrow 
from their own banks, which eventually went bankrupt and had to be rescued by the national authorities.  




provincial governments failed to do, which again lead to a new financial crisis in 2000–01. 
Following that episode, the National Congress passed a new FRL in 2004 that extended the 
contents of the 1999 law to all government levels including all provincial governments and the 
capital district (Braun and Gadano 2007). The FRL framework of 2004 has been criticized for not 
specifying spending arrangements on some budget items like wage increases (in particular, teacher 
salaries are the base category for the rest of government workers’ salaries in the provinces) and 
the still large transfer dependence from the national government for provinces to meet their fiscal 
targets (Liu and Webb, 2011). The concrete measures of Argentina’s FRL are summarized in Box 
3 below.  
The case of Colombia 
Colombia, even though not a federal country, underwent significant political and fiscal 
decentralization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, subnational governments had a 
high degree of borrowing autonomy, which eventually led many subnational governments to over-
borrow. In order to control subnational debt levels, the national government passed a fiscal stability 
law in 1997, which became known as the “Traffic Light Law.” The system consists of three layers 
for local borrowing discretion. Accordingly, if the subnational authority is highly indebted, it is 
not allowed to borrow any more (the red light). If the jurisdiction has some level of debt, but not 
in excessive amounts, then it requires approval from the Ministry of Finance (the yellow light). 
All other subnational governments with low levels of debt are allowed to borrow at their will (the 
green light). Although an attractive and logical scheme, in practice the “Traffic Light Law” did 
not perform that smoothly. Some local governments assigned a red light were still able to access 
credit without approval from the Ministry of Finance, and while some jurisdictions were moved 




(Echavarria et al., 2002). As a consequence, Colombia improved the legal framework for 
subnational borrowing including the introduction of new and updated fiscal rules in 2001 and 2002. 
Finally, in 2003 the national government adopted a full Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2003, which 
included the national and all subnational governments in the framework. The most important 
elements are summarized in Box 3 below.  
The case of Peru 
 Peru is an interesting case because it came to adopt fiscal decentralization reforms only 
very recently. And although it never experienced the type of fiscal issues at the subnational level 
that we saw in the cases of Argentina and Brazil—or even Colombia—Peruvian reformers were 
extremely cautious. Extrapolating from the subnational default experiences in those other Latin 
America countries, Peru passed a FRL in 2003, very early in its decentralization process. This was 
seen as a preventive measure and a way to reassure the country that the newly acquired 
decentralization would not lead to macroeconomic instability. The main features of Peru’s FRL 
are also summarized in Box 3.  
Box 3: Major Features of Fiscal Responsibility Laws in Four Latin American Emerging Countries 
Measures on budget transparency  
Argentina – Three-year budgeting plan with forecasting of revenue and expenditure by categories 
  
– An independent commission regulates budget categories and evaluates budget 
proposals. 
   
Brazil – All government levels must publish quarterly financial reports approved by audit 
authorities. 
  
– FRL mandates that SNGs’ budget plans must be consistent with multiyear federal 
budget plans. 
  
– All government levels use accrual accounting method, which removes arrears that are 
concealed debt issues most of the time. 
    
Colombia – Publish quarterly fiscal outcomes 




  – The central government is prohibited from lending to SNGs or guaranteeing its debt. 
  
– Prohibits the commitments on future spending and increases in personnel wages in an 
election year 
  – Transfers from local central authorities are not allowed to state-own enterprises 
    
Peru – The annual fiscal deficit cannot exceed the deficit target in the multiyear budget plan. 
  
– Regional governments must publish their annual fiscal reports, which should be 
consistent with the multiyear fiscal framework.  
    
Fiscal Targets 
Argentina – Primary spending growth rate cannot exceed overall GDP growth rate. 
  
– Provincial governments must adjust budget balances to keep the debt service below 
15% of current revenues. 
    
Brazil 
– Subnational governments must keep the personnel spending at or below 60 percent of 
fiscal revenue with special targets for each division of government. 
  – The Senate at the national level sets the special fiscal targets and ceilings.  
    
Colombia 
– FRL works with the Traffic-Light Law, setting the debt limits on the basis of the debt to 
payment capacity ratio. 
  
– Favorable credit ratings from international agencies are required to borrow for some 
sub-central authorities.  
    
Peru 
– Total public sector fiscal deficit, including SNGs (but excluding the financial sector) 
cannot exceed 1 percent of GDP. 
  – Total public-sector spending growth rate cannot be higher than 3 percent. 
  
– For each subnational government, the debt stock may not exceed 100 percent and debt 
service may not exceed 25 percent of the current revenues. 
  
– The three-year average of primary fiscal balances must be non-negative for subnational 
governments. 
   
Sanctions 
Argentina 
– Provincial governments may not borrow if they miss the fiscal targets. However, FRL 
does not impose strong sanctions on provincial governments. 
  – No escape clauses included in the FRL. 
  
Brazil 
– When a subnational government goes over the borrowing limit, its borrowing is 
prohibited and may not receive any "voluntary" grants from the national government.  
  
– The fiscal crimes law also sets penalties and punishments for public officials who 
violate the rules in the FRL. 
  
– Subnational governments can miss the fiscal target in the case where there is less than 
1-percent economic growth in the last four subsequent quarters (escape clause). 





– If the subnational government does not comply with the limits and regulations imposed 
by the FRLs, then they may not borrow any longer (including from the national 
government). 
  
– When financial institutions do not meet the conditions and regulations set by FRL, their 
contract is not valid, and any interest may not be charged on the borrowed credits. 
  – No escape clauses included in FRLs. 
    
Peru 
– Any violations of FRL by subnational governments may cause temporary cuts in block 
grants from the central government. 
  
– Subnational governments can miss fiscal targets in the case of negative economic 
growth and in national emergencies (escape clauses). 
Source: Liu and Webb 2011 and related country specific fiscal legislations. 
Going Beyond Rules: Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement 
There is wide consensus among subnational borrowing experts that effective, successful 
practices require going beyond subnational borrowing and fiscal rules (Rodden and Eskeland, 
2003; Kumar et. al., 2009; Ter-Minassian, 2015; Kotia and Lledo, 2016). Effective borrowing 
requires preventive measures, monitoring, enforcement, and if needed, sanctions. The strength 
with which the rules are applied, comprising monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, can be 
more important than the rule itself on the fiscal performance at the subnational level. And the 
available evidence backs up that conjecture, as in the finding of Kotia and Lledo (2016) for 
subnational fiscal discipline in Europe. In this section we review the different dimensions of 
effective monitoring and enforcement of borrowing rules. 
Prevention measures 
Before we look at the issues of monitoring and enforcement, it is important to highlight a 
number of preventive measures that can be adopted. First, the design and strength of the rest of the 
fiscal decentralization system plays an important role. Subnational borrowing is just one of the 
fundamental pillars of any fiscal decentralization system. How well it actually works, including 
the effectiveness of subnational borrowing rules, is closely linked to the design of the other three 




we have already seen, design flaws in any of those three other pillars (for example, the presence 
of vertical fiscal imbalances resulting from insufficient revenue autonomy to cover expenditure 
responsibilities) can have significant negative consequences on subnational borrowing practices. 
This is not the place to expound on these issues, but it is important to make it clear that important 
prevention measures lie outside the immediate scope of subnational borrowing itself and need to 
start with the overall design of the fiscal decentralization system.  
Second, we need to make sure that borrowing rules and monitoring have the widest scope 
possible. Limiting the extent of “off-budget” spending or borrowing is an essential factor to 
increase the rule strength (Von Hagen and Wolff, 2006; Buti et al., 2007; Kotia and Lledo, 2016). 
The purview of debt limits and fiscal rules should include the whole consolidated public sector, 
not only subnational public administrations but also government-owned enterprises and all other 
financial vehicles that may otherwise allow subnational governments to go around the rule.  
In many emerging economies, “off-budget” activities, often involving private-public 
partnerships, can result in contingent liabilities for subnational governments, which the borrowing 
rules at the subnational level most frequently fail to cover. These backdoor avenues tend to reduce 
the discipline-enhancing effect of subnational fiscal rules and threaten overall stability.  
Ambiguity can also come from the lack of proper targeting of the variables to be monitored. 
Fiscal rules need to state clearly what is being targeted, such as primary balance, overall budget 
deficit, or the level of public debt—and whether those should be measured on the basis of actual 
figures or cyclically adjusted data. Similarly, escape clauses and the conditions under which they 
would apply need to be carefully spelled out. Ambiguity about target variables can significantly 
weaken fiscal rules’ strength.  




subnational borrowing. The prudential mitigation of credit risks associated with subnational 
authorities is an important strategy to facilitate the flow of lending funds to subnational 
governments outside the government sector (Rodden and Eskeland, 2003). In the first place, this 
can be achieved through accepting and enhancing the role of private credit rating agencies or 
alternatively, an independent public authority (for example, an autonomous fiscal council) that 
does an equivalent type of credit analyses Throughout this report the emphasis has been on the 
dangers posed by subnational borrowing. However, in many occasions the lack of loanable funds 
can be a big problem, or a bigger problem, in emerging economies. Thus, reducing the perception 
of those risks via transparent budgets and reliance on credit rating mechanisms can play a very 
useful role.  
Another way to facilitate lending from the private sector to subnational governments is to 
adopt direct risk mitigation measures (Rodden and Eskeland, 2003). After all, financial markets 
may exaggerate the actual risk associated with the lending to subnational governments and thus 
lead to a suboptimal level of borrowing. Over the years, many governments have attempted to do 
so in a variety of ways. One of the most commonly used risk mitigation measures has been to offer 
some form of loan guarantees. Prudently used, this can be an effective tool to facilitate subnational 
borrowing. One such form of this is the on-lending of international agency loans to subnational 
governments via the central government that guarantees repayment. Another form of loan 
guarantee, but one that can be actually more problematic, is the use of government “intercepts.” In 
this setup, the central authorities agree to intercept and retain revenue sharing transfers and other 
central government funds flowing to the subnational governments to guarantee subnational debt 
service and that lenders are repaid. However, more open-ended loan guarantees by central 




Private lenders would reduce their scrutiny of credit worthiness of subnational lenders and less 
disciplined borrowers would be more likely to have access to private credit. In fact, most countries 
nowadays prohibit central government guarantees in their borrowing and fiscal rules. Additionally, 
the use of government intercepts has been also associated high levels of market moral hazard and 
has become less frequently used.  
Monitoring of borrowing practices.  
Monitoring the implementation of borrowing regulations is of key importance regarding 
the sustainability of subnational debt levels. And coordination between the central and subnational 
governments with a clear institutional mechanism allowing an open dialog and transparent flow of 
information is an essential dimension of the monitoring system of subnational government debt 
(Kumar et al., 2009). 
Enforcement of borrowing and fiscal rules 
For enforcement, governments can rely on strong market discipline, if it is available. But 
as we have seen in most emerging economies, the lack of financial market development can 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of this approach. This means that in different forms, effective 
enforcement requires hierarchical oversight by central authorities or, alternatively, independently 
strong fiscal councils.  
Little question that another mechanism that makes the rule stronger is the capacity of 
monitoring (Bohn and Inman, 1996). Monitoring is typically charged to the Ministry of Finance at 
the central level. However, it is preferable to have an independent institution to monitor the 
implementation of the borrowing rules. 




effective complement to official monitoring mechanisms. Debrun et al. (2008) and Kotia and Lledo 
(2016) find that media visibility of fiscal rules can lead to enhanced fiscal discipline. 
The enforcement of borrowing and other fiscal rules has been increasingly shifted to fiscal 
councils. As we have seen, these are independent authorities that most often have been established 
with the purpose of precisely monitoring and enforcing fiscal rules.20 Moreover, fiscal councils 
may monitor the implementation of escape clauses in the case of economic crises. Escape clauses 
are not only difficult to design but perhaps even more difficult to implement well. Fiscal councils, 
because of their independence and impartiality, are ideally equipped to perform that role.  
According to the most recently available count, fiscal councils have been established in 39 
countries around the world.21 Among non-Asian emerging countries, that count is 10. The fiscal 
councils in non-Asian countries have diverse institutional frameworks. In seven non-Asian 
countries, fiscal councils are charged with monitoring the entire general government—thus 
covering also subnational governments—while in three of the non-Asian emerging economies, 
fiscal councils focus exclusively on the central government level. Table 1 describes the adoption 
of fiscal councils in non-Asian emerging countries. 
Table 1. Fiscal Councils in Non-Asian Emerging Countries 
Country 
Name 
Name of Fiscal Council Established in Coverage 
Monitoring of 
Fiscal Rules 















Iran Public sector Directorate of 1991 General Yes 
                                                          
20 Their popularity has increased since many governments have gone through debt and deficit issues associated with 
the financial crisis in 2007. International organizations such as the IMF and OECD have encouraged setting up fiscal 
councils especially in countries that have experienced problems with debt sustainability. 




Parliament (Majlis) Research 
Center 
Government 

































An important drawback of fiscal councils is that government authorities often resist being 
criticized by an institution that—even though it is supposed to be independent—is a part of the 
government establishment. The recent events with Hungary’s Fiscal Council illustrate well this 
point for how the country’s government reduced its role to avoid criticism. The Fiscal Council of 
Hungary was established in 2009, but just two years later, the council’s activities were restricted 
after criticizing the government for lack of transparency and over-optimistic economic forecasts. 
Typically, the staffing of fiscal councils is technical without regard to any political representation. 
Among non-Asian emerging economies, that is the case, for example, in the fiscal councils of 
Slovenia and Hungary. Another option is to incorporate political representation. But in this case, 
it is much harder to talk about an independent authority, which is supposed to be detached from 
partisan interests in monitoring fiscal performance. As an example of the latter, the Nigerian Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission consists of technical staff and elected officials representing not only 
the central government but also state governments.22 In particular, the representatives of the state 
                                                          




governments are supposed to take a role in monitoring and enforcing expenditure and borrowing 
policies of subnational governments. Finally, consolidated general government debt ceilings can 
also help with enforcement. Consolidated debt ceilings come about via two avenues: a) imposed 
by supranational government agreements or b) imposed by the country’s own national legislatures. 
Among non-Asian emerging economies, consolidated debt ceilings for the Eastern European 
countries are imposed by the European Union, as part of a supranational rule, in this case the 
Maastricht Treaty. Among other Non-Asian Emerging Countries, consolidated debt ceilings tend 
to work as a debt ceiling imposed by their own national legislation. The actual number of countries 
in our sample with this type of constraint has varied over time (Figure 7). The effectiveness of this 
approach relies either on the oversight and pressure exercised by supranational bodies or on the 
mutual monitoring exercised between central and subnational governments to see that no one 
breaks the existing agreements for how to share the consolidated debt limits. The latter is also 
relevant for those cases where the overall limit is imposed supra-nationally. In both of the 
modalities, it has proved difficult to reach a modus operandi for sharing the consolidated debt 
limit. Arriving at the sharing rule may be achieved through discussion and consensus, but often 




Figure 7. Existing Consolidated Government Debt Limits for NAECs 
Source: IMF Fiscal Rules Dataset, 2017. 
Notes: The sample size is 14 Non-Asian emerging countries, which data is available. 
Bailouts, sanctions, and bankruptcy laws for undisciplined governments  
Lastly, there is a need for enforcement. Among other things, this includes a clearly 
established corrective mechanism should noncompliance with the rules be apparent. One of the 
main difficulties for imposing effective fiscal discipline has been the practice of implementing 
bailouts for bankrupt subnational governments. The precedent of previous bailouts can signal a 
lack of serious commitment by central government to enforce hard budget constraints and to 
sanction noncompliant subnational governments (Plekhanov and Singh, 2007). In reality, a good 
number of non-Asian emerging economies have a history of subnational bailouts. They have been 
common in Latin American countries but not exclusively in that region (Table 2).23 
Table 2. Non-Asian Emerging Economy Subnational Bailout History 
Country Bailout Country Bailout 
Argentina Yes Nigeria Yes 
                                                          
23 Many of the bailouts, which can be quite expensive, preceded the introduction of FRLs and the introduction of 


























Brazil Yes Peru No 
Bulgaria No Poland No 
Chile Yes Romania No 
Colombia Yes Russia Yes 
Czech 
Republic 
No Slovenia No 
Hungary Yes South Africa No 
Mexico Yes Turkey No 
 
It is not only a history of actual bailouts that can be damaging to fiscal discipline. Expected 
bailouts can also play a significant role in subnational debt sustainability. Lenders and financial 
markets in general are more likely to ignore the unsustainable accumulation of subnational debt if 
there is a perceived implicit guarantee by central governments. Indeed, some studies have argued 
that implicit guarantees from the central government played a prominent role on the eventual 
subnational bailouts in Russia and Mexico in the 1990s (Lanchovichina, Liu, and Nagarajan, 2007; 
Liu and Waibel, 2008). In the face of noncompliance, central authorities can make use of sanctions 
and the application of bankruptcy laws. Sanctions are quite common; for example, they are 
typically included within the framework of FRLs in Latin American countries. In the case of 
Colombia, under the “traffic light law,” noncompliant subnational governments are prohibited 
from any new borrowing. In the case of Brazil, beyond prohibition of any new borrowing, the 
federal government can reduce or eliminate discretionary transfers to the state governments.  
Subnational bankruptcy laws are less common among non-Asian emerging economies. To 
address subnational defaults, Hungary and South Africa have enacted bankruptcy acts in 1996 and 
2003, respectively. The main purpose of the acts is to lay out the legal framework and procedures 
in the case of subnational debt resolution. With the restructuring of the debt, the framework 




Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
Subnational borrowing is efficient and intergenerationally equitable. However, subnational 
borrowing also poses clear dangers to the macroeconomic stability of fiscally decentralized 
countries. Because of these dangers, the temptation may be to prohibit it, but that will not provide 
the optimal solution. The best way out of this dilemma is to allow subnational governments to 
borrow but also regulate, monitor, and enforce compliance with the rules. In this paper we have 
explored the experiences of non-Asian emerging economies with the regulation and enforcement 
of borrowing practices. What are the lessons from those experiences? First, good outcomes on debt 
governance are not only about borrowing rules and other controls. A well-balanced fiscal 
decentralization design between expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments with 
significant tax revenue autonomy is critical for the fiscal disciplined behavior of local governments 
regarding not only spending but also deficits and debt. The presence of large vertical fiscal 
imbalances (due to insufficient tax revenue autonomy) puts into motion perverse local government 
fiscal behaviors associated with the common pool problem and moral hazard. Irresponsible 
borrowing and excessive spending and deficits are the symptoms, if not otherwise suppressed and 
controlled, of an asymmetric design of fiscal decentralization with large expenditure 
responsibilities and insufficient revenue autonomy.  
Second, there is a need for inclusive definitions and accounting of debt: subnational 
governments can bypass controls and even prohibitions by adapting less visible or formal forms 
of debt. Thus, it is important to be able to identify all the forms debt can take either explicitly 
contracted or otherwise created by sub-central governments (e.g., accruals or arrears in payments 
to suppliers or providers). Good practice also calls for the accounting of unfunded future liabilities 




of borrowing regulations is also critical. As we have seen, even though the “traffic light law” in 
Colombia does not allow subnational governments to borrow if they are in the red-light category, 
in practice, they do borrow using state-owned enterprises or other “off-budget” instruments.  
Third, regarding subnational borrowing rules, among the different options available, non-
Asian emerging countries have shown a definite predilection for centrally imposed rules. A good 
combination of transparency and a high degree of control by the central administration may explain 
this choice. However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the different borrowing 
regimes is far from decisive. It would seem that more general cross-cutting rules, such as overall 
debt limits and the golden rule, are clearly effective, while most specific borrowing regimes tend 
to be effective as long as they are really enforced.  
Fourth, the recent introduction of Fiscal Councils in a good number of developed countries 
and some developing countries points to their effectiveness in achieving overall improved fiscal 
discipline at the national level. As some countries are already doing, it would be desirable to 
empower fiscal councils where they already exist to monitor and exert the same watchdog role for 
the overall fiscal discipline of subnational governments. And in the case of countries where no 
fiscal councils have been introduced, it would be a positive step to consider their introduction and, 
with extended powers, to monitor the borrowing and overall fiscal behavior of subnational 
governments.  
Fifth, adopting Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRLs) early and with wide scope including the 
national and subnational governments significantly reinforces the legal framework behind 
borrowing rules and will help prevent fiscal indiscipline and national fiscal crises. These FRLs 
should include measures for enhanced fiscal transparency, specific fiscal targets for all government 




Sixth, besides fiscal rules and borrowing regulations, enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms are vital for the rule strength. Implementation of the first FRL in Argentina is one 
example that, without enforcement, laws may not work by themselves. We have seen that fiscal 
rules have a positive impact on the subnational fiscal discipline. However, the design of fiscal rules 
by itself is not the remedy that cures all the issues in subnational or national fiscal performance. 
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Appendix 1. Borrowing Autonomy Index, Non-Asian Emerging Economies24 
Borrowing Autonomy: the extent to which a regional government can borrow (0–3): 
0. The regional government cannot borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing) 
1. A prior approval is required: the regional government’s borrowing is subject to central 
government approval and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions: 
i golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)  
ii no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank  
iii no borrowing above a ceiling  
iv borrowing is limited to specific purposes  
2. The regional government may borrow without any prior approval by the central 
government; but under one or more of i, ii, iii, iv is in place. 





                                                          
24 Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary, Schakel, Arjan H., Chapman-Osterkatz, Sandra, Niedzwiecki, Sara, and Shair-
Rosenfield, Sarah. (2016). Measuring regional authority. Volume I: A postfunctionalist theory of 




















































































































































































































































































































Table A-1. Non- Asian Emerging Country List 
Latin America Eastern Europe Other Countries 
Argentina Bulgaria Nigeria 
Brazil Czech Republic Russia 
Chile Hungary South Africa 
Colombia Poland Turkey 
Mexico Romania  
Peru Slovenia  
 Ukraine  
Notes: Data are not available for the following emerging countries: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Mauritius, Oman, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates. Therefore, they were excluded from the analysis. 







Table A-2: Bailout Cases and Corresponding Legal Actions in Emerging Latin America 
Countries 
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2001 and 2002. 
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Law in 1999. in 
2004, it is 
extended to all 
sectors of the 
government. Argentina and Brazil do 
not have an independent 
body that scrutinizes the 
government's budget 
plans and compliance 
with fiscal rules. 
Credits to the highly 
indebted Provinces 
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Province of Cordoba 
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federal government 
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Central 
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